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We assess how tax-benefit policy developments in 2001–11 affected the household income distribution 
in seven EU countries. We use the standard microsimulation-based decomposition method, separating 
further the effect of structural policy changes and the uprating of monetary parameters, which allows 
us to measure the extent of fiscal drag and benefit erosion in practice. The results show that despite dif-
ferent fiscal effects, policies overall mostly reduced poverty and inequality and both types of policy 
developments had sizeable effects on the income distribution. We also find that the uprating of mone-
tary parameters not only had a positive effect on household incomes, meaning fiscal drag and benefit 
erosion were avoided, but generally also contributed more to poverty and inequality reduction than 
structural policy reforms.
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1. introduction
The subject of income distribution has seen an upsurge of interest in the eco-
nomic literature since the 1990s (Atkinson, 1997), and especially so in the after-
math of the Great Recession with the negative consequences of rising inequality 
moving into the spotlight (e.g. Stiglitz, 2012; Corak, 2013; Piketty, 2014; Atkinson, 
2015). Much attention has been paid to tax and benefit policies, which directly 
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influence household income distribution and over which policy makers have more 
control than other factors (e.g. Bargain et al., 2017; Paulus et al. , 2017).
Governments employ two broad types of action to re-shape national tax-ben-
efit systems: the uprating of monetary parameters of existing policy instruments 
and structural changes involving the introduction of new policy elements (param-
eters) or abolition of existing ones. Typically these occur in parallel, making it 
challenging to distinguish between the two. Even though the distinction has both 
conceptual and practical importance, it has not been attempted in empirical anal-
ysis of micro-level impacts of tax-benefit policies.
In this paper, we extend previous literature by quantifying each type of fiscal 
policy action and measuring their effects on the income distribution. We define 
structural effects as those arising from the modifications to the design of the 
tax-benefit system (e.g. introduction of a new benefit) and indexation effects stem-
ming from the uprating of monetary parameters such as benefit amounts and tax 
thresholds, either based on automatic statutory indexation or discretionary (ad 
hoc) adjustments. Insufficient uprating would lead to tax increases through people 
‘falling’ into higher tax brackets and decreasing relative value of cash benefits—
referred to as fiscal drag (or bracket creep) and benefit erosion.
Previous research has mainly concentrated on assessing fiscal drag and benefit 
erosion on the basis of hypothetical scenarios, where prices or incomes are assumed 
to grow by a certain factor and tax-benefit policies kept constant or adjusted only 
according to statutory rules (Immervoll, 2005; Immervoll et al. , 2006; Sutherland 
et al. , 2008). In contrast, our indexation effect measures actual fiscal drag and 
benefit erosion and how it has contributed to the overall impact of tax-benefit 
policies. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been estimated before. Our 
new approach is nested in the broader decomposition framework of Bargain and 
Callan (2010), relying on tax-benefit microsimulation modelling (Bourguignon 
and Spadaro, 2006; O’Donoghue, 2014) to construct counterfactual income dis-
tributions. Microsimulation models can identify the (direct) policy effect by simu-
lating alternative tax-benefit policies, while keeping “everything else” constant, e.g. 
the population structure and the distribution of gross market incomes.
We apply partial decomposition to study the distributional effects of tax- 
benefit policies in selected European countries and the role played by fiscal drag 
and benefit erosion. In the European context, public pensions are usually indexed 
but most countries do not have automatic indexing regimes to adjust the levels 
of other benefits or tax thresholds over time. This increases the likelihood of tax- 
benefit systems lagging behind general developments in the economy and may 
contribute to larger fiscal drag and benefit erosion. We consider the decade since 
2001, when a strong emphasis was placed on reducing poverty and social exclu-
sion at the EU level (European Council, 2000) but which has not received much 
attention in the literature with international developments in the pre-crisis period 
particularly understudied. This is also a period which contains episodes of both 
economic growth and recession and allows us to study indexation effects in the 
context of a full business cycle. We cover a selection of EU countries—Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy and the UK—varying in the size of 
the welfare state, experience of economic change and fiscal policy reforms and 
indexation practices.
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The specific questions we seek to address are: Did tax-benefit policy develop-
ments contribute to increasing or reducing poverty and inequality, even if  other 
factors may have been pushing in the other direction? Did these differ across the 
business cycle? How important was indexation compared with structural changes 
to policies? Has the lack of widespread automatic indexation mechanisms con-
tributed to lower progressivity of tax-benefit systems and increased poverty and 
inequality levels? Were there any common patterns in government decisions across 
EU countries, despite differences in welfare systems and economic conditions?
Our results show that tax-benefit policy developments in 2001–11 were on the 
whole equalizing, reducing relative poverty and inequality levels in these countries 
(with Hungary being a clear exception). However, budgetary effects differed sub-
stantially across countries leading to household income losses in some (Greece, 
Italy and the UK) and gains in others. We also find that both types of policy devel-
opments had sizeable effects on the income distribution. However, the way mone-
tary parameters were uprated (indexed) not only had a positive effect on household 
incomes—meaning fiscal drag and benefit erosion were generally avoided—but 
also contributed more to poverty and inequality alleviation than changes to the 
structure of policies. Our analysis helps to better understand policy actions and 
choices in this period, in a cross-national perspective.
We proceed by discussing the importance of distinguishing between structural 
changes and indexation effects in Section 2. We then explain our decomposition 
approach in Section 3 and, in Section 4, consider the implications of chosen bench-
mark indexation factors, relevant for deriving counterfactual income distributions. 
Section 5 describes the tax-benefit model EUROMOD and the data used in the 
analysis. We present our empirical findings in Section 6. The paper is summarized 
and concluded in Section 7.
2. structurAl cHAnges And indexAtion effect
It is for several reasons that the distinction between structural policy 
reforms and the uprating of monetary parameters matters, which we refer to 
as the indexation effect. First, even though both types of policy action can be 
employed to bring about new budget priorities they also have two distinct aims. 
Structural changes seek to augment the tax-benefit system to achieve a more 
optimal design, balancing between various objectives and constraints. Uprating 
is necessary to adjust nominal parameters in the tax-benefit system over time 
in line with movements in prices and incomes and keep the tax-benefit system 
“stable” in a dynamic economic environment. It is this function we mainly focus 
on in the reminder of the paper. In principle, similar fiscal or distributional 
outcomes can be achieved through the indexation of monetary parameters of 
the tax-benefit system and through a change in the design of the system. But 
this does not necessarily hold for each individual instrument and the two types 
of changes should therefore be seen as complements rather than substitutes. For 
example, starting from a universal benefit (i.e. one monetary parameter), it is 
not possible to introduce means-testing through a set of changes to monetary 
levels.
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Note that our notion of structural changes is a somewhat narrower concept 
compared to what might usually be referred to as “reforms”. The latter can include 
differential uprating of monetary parameters, which would here be captured as 
part of the indexation effect together with any statutory indexation as such.
Second, different types of policy action are not equally salient for household 
perceptions, which in turn can have important implications for behavioral reac-
tions (Chetty et al. , 2009). It is possible that the cumulative effect of uprating, or 
lack of it, is considerably more important for household welfare than even major 
structural changes in tax-benefit systems though it is often the latter which receive 
more attention in academic and policy discussions. Similarly, in comparison with 
regular increments in benefits and tax thresholds, occasional “giveaways” (with the 
same budgetary cost) may be more salient to voters and hence more attractive to 
policymakers (Sutherland et al. , 2008), though imply weaker automatic stabilizers 
and less consumption smoothing. A piecemeal approach also allows policymakers 
to target different population subgroups in turn (for example, in a series of annual 
budgets over the election cycle) in an attempt to increase popular votes, while the 
real shifts in budget priorities are obscured and may be lacking altogether.
3. tHe decomPosition metHod
Our starting point for the analysis is the standard fiscal microsimulation 
modelling technique. Tax-benefit microsimulation models simulate the detailed 
rules of taxes and benefits for a representative sample of households under exist-
ing or alternative policy rules and hence derive their net incomes under various 
policy assumptions while holding everything else constant (Figari et al. , 2015). In 
a static framework, household income variation across different scenarios cap-
tures then the first-order effect of tax-benefit policies on the income distribution.
Considering specifically the effects of tax-benefit policies over time, Bargain 
and Callan (2010) suggested a decomposition framework separating the (direct) 
effect of policies from other factors such as changes in the population structure 
and market incomes when analyzing observed changes in the income distribution. 
Recognizing that household net incomes are a function of the tax-benefit rules 
and household socio-economic characteristics including market incomes, they 
identify the contribution of each component to changes in net incomes by varying 
a single component in turn while keeping others fixed. Several extensions have 
been proposed to further separate out labor supply effects (Bargain, 2012; Bargain 
et al. , 2015; Creedy and Hérault, 2015; Hérault and Azpitarte, 2016). In this paper, 
we focus on the role of policies, corresponding to a partial decomposition in the 
Bargain and Callan (2010) framework, but introduce further subcomponents to 
distinguish between the structural effect and indexation effect.
Formally, following the notation in Bargain and Callan (2010), we define y 
as a matrix which contains information on market incomes (and socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics) of the households, and d(p,y) a function that 
derives disposable incomes on the basis of y, distinguishing between the structure 
of the tax-benefit system (d) and policy parameters with monetary values (p). Let 
us also define I ( ⋅ ) as a summary indicator for a part or the whole distribution of 
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disposable income. This could be for example, mean income for a particular group 
of households or a measure of income inequality or poverty. Subscripts 0 and 1 
refer to start-period and end-period values, respectively. Based on this notation, the 
policy effect conditional on end-period market income and population (y1) equals:
The expression d1
(
p1,y1
)
 refers to the actual income distribution in period 1, 
while d0
(
훼p0,y1
)
 represents a counterfactual income distribution in which we have 
replaced the tax-benefit policies from period 1 with the policies from period 0. 
Notice that the counterfactual term has the nominal values of monetary parame-
ters adjusted by a factor α to make them comparable over time. We will discuss the 
choice and interpretation of α in Section 4. Similarly, the policy effect conditional 
on start-period market income and population 
(
y0
)
 can be expressed as:
where d0(p0,y0) stands for the actual income distribution in period 0 and d1
(
1
훼
p1,y0
)
 
is the counterfactual.1 In analogue, the effect of changes in the population struc-
ture and market incomes would be obtained by varying the second argument (y) 
under fixed policy rules (either from period 0 or 1), so that the two components 
(policy effect and “other effect”) add up to the total observed change in I , i.e. 
I
[
d1
(
p1,y1
)]
−I
[
d0
(
p0,y0
)]
. For more details on the full decomposition approach, 
see Bargain and Callan (2010). Given our focus on policy effects as well as data 
limitations (discussed further below), we do not repeat all the details here.
We embed the structural effect and indexation effect in the same framework 
and obtain these by decomposing the policy effect further. The indexation effect 
measures how governments have adjusted monetary parameters through a combi-
nation of statutory indexation and discrete adjustments relative to the benchmark 
(e.g. changes in incomes or price levels), hence capturing changes in the effective 
tax burden (i.e. fiscal drag) and in the relative value of benefits (i.e. benefit erosion). 
The structural effect captures structural changes, both substantial reforms such as 
the introduction of new benefits or taxes (or abolishing existing ones) as well as 
changing the design of existing instruments by altering non-monetary parameters 
(e.g. tax rate, benefit eligibility conditions). Distinguishing between these effects 
therefore allows the two types of government action with distinct aims to be quan-
tified, which might either counterbalance or reinforce each other. To achieve this, 
we rewrite the policy effect component in equation (1) as:
(1) I [d1
(
p1,y1
)
]−I [d0
(
훼p0,y1
)
]
(2) I
[
d1
(
1
훼
p1,y0
)]
−I
[
d0(p0,y0)
]
1An alternative would have been to deflate year 1 incomes (y1) to year 0 prices in equation 1 and 
inflate year 0 incomes (y0) to year 1 prices in equation 2. Equation 1 and 2 presented here match our 
empirical strategy explained at the end of Section 3.
(3)
I [d1(p1,y1)]−I [d1(훼p0,y1)]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Indexation effect conditional on tax-benefit system 1
+ I [d1(훼p0,y1)]−I [d0(훼p0,y1)]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Structural effect conditional on monetary parameters 0
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and in equation (2) as
In the estimation of the indexation effect, we keep the tax-benefit rules, d, as of 
period 1 but apply in turn the monetary parameters from the two periods. In the 
estimation of the structural effect, the monetary parameters, p, are as of period 0, 
and we alter the tax-benefit rules. It is important to notice that by construction, 
the choice of benchmark indexation factor 훼 affects primarily the indexation effect 
where it enters one of the terms, rather than the structural effect where it is applied 
to both terms or neither.
We can now summarize how these equations are applied to measure the 
(direct) policy effect in the period of interest (2001–11) as well as in two sub-peri-
ods, the period before the economic crisis (2001–07) and the years covering its start 
(2007–11). We have information available on the population characteristics and the 
distribution of market incomes in 2007 (see Section 5), y07. Hence, we measure the 
policy effect in 2001–07 with equation (1) and the policy effect in 2007–11 with 
equation (2), i.e. both conditional on y07. The advantage of measuring the effect in 
two periods in the same units is that it allows them to be combined easily to obtain 
the total policy effect in 2001–11. The policy effect in 2001–07 is decomposed fur-
ther using equation (3) and the policy effect in 2007–11 using equation (4). When 
interpreting the results, it is important to remember that these are conditional on 
the population characteristics being as of 2007.2
4. tHe bencHmArk indexAtion
When estimating the impact of changes to benefit amounts and tax thresh-
olds on household incomes, these should be considered in the context of broader 
macroeconomic developments. In this section, we discuss the choice of bench-
mark (or counterfactual) indexation factor α for adjusting the nominal tax-ben-
efit amounts over time. It is worth emphasizing that the choice of α per se is not 
related to what governments aim to do or actually do—the role of the benchmark 
index is to offer a yardstick against which to measure the progress of actual gov-
ernment policies and each benchmark has a specific economic interpretation.
Similar to previous studies (e.g. Clarke and Leicester, 2004; Bargain et al. , 
2015, 2017), we employ multiple benchmark indexation factors: in one scenario, 
α equals the change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and in another, it reflects 
growth in average market incomes, which we refer to as the Market Income Index 
(4)
I
[
d1
(
1
훼
p1,y0
)]
−I [d1(p0,y0)]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Indexation effect conditional on tax-benefit system 1
+ I [d1(p0,y0)]−I [d0(p0,y0)]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Structural effect conditional on monetary parameters 0
2The tax-benefit system d may not be only a function of market incomes and population charac-
teristics but also certain expenditures such as housing costs. As we focus on the static effect of policy 
reforms, abstracting from individual behavioral responses, expenditures are considered exogenous, sim-
ilar to market incomes. Hence, expenditures are kept nominally constant at their 2007 level in all coun-
terfactual scenarios.
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(MII). While Bargain and Callan (2010) make a case for the MII-based benchmark 
index, this appears to follow from an economic interpretation they give to their 
decomposition approach rather than being strictly imposed by the method itself. To 
better understand the implications of each benchmark index, let us first consider 
how the income distribution would change over time if  all monetary parameters 
were indeed uprated with a given factor and there were no structural policy changes.
If  MII were used to uprate policy parameters, the aggregate share of income 
which is taxed away or added as benefits would remain broadly constant (though 
the same is unlikely to hold for a given household as their market income can exceed 
or remain below the average growth rate) and the degree of redistribution unchanged 
as long as the population structure remains the same.3 MII-based -uprating in prac-
tice would hence imply a neutral treatment of households on benefits and those 
with earnings—if household market incomes were rising (falling) in real terms, 
households on benefits would gain (lose) in real terms. With our decomposition 
approach and MII as the benchmark index, the indexation effect would capture to 
what extent actual uprating deviates from such a fiscally neutral scenario.
CPI-based uprating in practice would imply that households on benefits can 
afford to buy the same basket of goods over time, throughout the business cycle. 
However, they would lose out (gain) relative to household with earnings if  mar-
ket incomes were increasing (decreasing) in real terms. With real market income 
growth, tax brackets also grow at a lower rate than market incomes and households 
end up paying proportionally more tax. This results in total tax revenues growing 
at a higher rate than benefit expenditures and the public finance position improves. 
The opposite happens when market incomes are falling in real terms. The index-
ation effect measured with CPI as the benchmark allows an assessment of whether 
the actual uprating is adequate to account for inflation. Following Heinemann 
(2001), the indexation effect using the MII and CPI-based benchmarks could also 
be interpreted as measuring real and nominal fiscal drag.
We examine the effect of tax-benefit policies over the period 2001–11, using 
the two benchmark indexation factors in turn. The policy effect that we capture 
includes actual indexation practice, which may conform or not to one of the 
benchmark indices, together with reforms to the structure of tax-benefit systems 
or individual taxes and benefits. Due to the very different movements in prices 
and incomes in the countries considered over this period, as shown in Table 1, 
the assumption about what index to use as the benchmark can make a notable 
difference to the conclusions that are drawn about the relative size of policy effects 
across countries.
5. euromod And dAtA
To evaluate household disposable income under different policy scenarios, a 
tax-benefit microsimulation model is required. We use EUROMOD, which is the 
3This holds for tax-benefit systems, which are approximately linearly homogenous (though not 
necessarily linear). See Callan et al. (2007) for an illustration for Ireland. On that basis, Bargain and 
Callan (2015) refer to this as a “distributionally neutral” benchmark. Clark and Leicester (2013) use 
growth in nominal GDP as a benchmark and interpret it is as a “constant progressivity” index.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2019
8
© 2019 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf 
of International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
only comparative model available for European countries. EUROMOD simu-
lates direct personal tax and social insurance contribution liabilities as well as 
cash benefit entitlements according to the national tax-benefit policy rules for a 
given year and using information available in the input micro-data (see Sutherland 
and Figari, 2013). The model makes use of micro-data from nationally represen-
tative samples of households from the European Union Statistics on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) and Family Resources Survey (FRS) for the UK, 
which contain detailed information on individual and household characteristics 
as well as income by source. The model baseline simulations are thoroughly val-
idated and documented4 and the model has been used in a wide range of applica-
tions, see Fernández Salgado et al. (2014), Dolls et al. (2012) and Immervoll et al. 
(2011) for some examples.
4See EUROMOD Country Reports available at https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/
country-reports
TABLE 1  
bencHmArk income- And Price-indices
Country
MII CPI
2001–07 2007–11 2001–11 2001–07 2007–11 2001–11
Belgium 1.162 1.070 1.243 1.122 1.112 1.247
Bulgaria 1.759 1.580 2.780 1.404 1.233 1.731
Estonia 2.039 1.152 2.349 1.252 1.193 1.494
Greece 1.425 0.989 1.409 1.220 1.141 1.391
Hungary 1.673 1.129 1.889 1.369 1.205 1.65
Italy 1.161 1.039 1.206 1.150 1.084 1.247
UK 1.258 1.083 1.362 1.114 1.104 1.229
Sources : MII is calculated using the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD to derive 
the change in average market income. The 2007 values are taken from the input dataset (see Table 2) 
and the 2001 and 2011 values are obtained by updating (or backdating) 2007 incomes with separate 
factors by income source reflecting their average growth. The same CPI index which is used inter-
nally in EUROMOD is also used as the basis of the counterfactual indexation, for consistency. See 
EUROMOD Country Reports for more information on market income updating and the specific 
CPI sources (https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports).
TABLE 2  
dAtA descriPtion
Country Input Dataset
Income Reference 
Period
Number of 
Households
Number of 
Individuals
Belgium (BE) EU-SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 6,300 15,072
Bulgaria (BG) EU-SILC and 
National SILC 
2008
2007 (annual) 4,339 12,148
Estonia (EE) National SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 4,744 12,999
Greece (EL) National SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 6,504 16,814
Hungary (HU) EU-SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 8,818 22,335
Italy (IT) National SILC 2008 2007 (annual) 20,928 52,135
United Kingdom 
(UK)
FRS 2008/9 2008/9 (monthly) 25,088 57,276
Source : EUROMOD version F6.36.
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We have selected seven countries for the analysis—Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy and the United Kingdom—to represent a wide range across 
the EU in several relevant dimensions. First of all, our selection of countries fea-
tures not only those which rank high in the EU in terms of income poverty and 
inequality—and hence may potentially benefit more from closer scrutiny—but also 
includes examples of low poverty and inequality levels (Belgium and Hungary) for 
comparison.5 Second, the countries vary greatly by the size of the welfare state and 
hence by their scope for potential policy action: the level of general government 
expenditure ranges from low (Estonia) to medium (Bulgaria, UK) and high 
(Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Italy). The redistributive impact of their transfer sys-
tems is the lowest for Italy and Greece across the EU, followed closely by Bulgaria 
and Estonia, while the UK, Belgium and Hungary are in the top-range of the 
scale.6 Third, the countries exhibited very different economic performances in the 
2000s, relevant for achieving variation in our indexation benchmarks: GDP growth 
rates in Italy and Greece were among the lowest in the EU, modest in the UK, 
Belgium and Hungary and among the highest in Estonia and Bulgaria. The dynam-
ics of GDP were especially varied through the economic crisis and include exam-
ples of drastic decreases (Greece, Estonia), small recessions (Italy, Hungary, UK) 
and even modest growth episodes (Belgium, Bulgaria). Price developments were 
also substantial in all countries and differed markedly.7 Last but not least, statu-
tory indexation practices diverge between the countries from their coverage being 
limited to public pensions (Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Hungary) to including also 
some benefits (Italy) as well as tax parameters (Belgium and the UK). Making use 
of various economic and policy settings in our analysis can contribute to broader 
insights and strengthen the main conclusions.
For these countries, we have extended the standard version of EUROMOD 
with the 2001 policy rules (in consultation with national experts) and apply these 
together with the 2007 and 2011 policies already present in EUROMOD. Our sim-
ulations are based on SILC 2008 referring to 2007 market incomes (FRS 2008/09 
for the UK), see Table 2. By design, any changes to the demographic structure and 
socio-economic characteristics of the population such as education level, house-
hold structure and employment are not captured in the analysis. However, our 
5Ranking the EU28 countries by the standard at-risk of (relative) poverty rate (Eurostat indicator 
ilc_li02) shows that HU and BE featured low levels of poverty (12–15 percent) and other five countries 
high levels of poverty risk (18–22 percent) in 2007. Similarly, income inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient (Eurostat indicator ilc_di12) was low in HU and BE (25–26 percent) and high in the other 
countries (32–35 percent) in 2007.
6Total general government expenditure as a percent of GDP (Eurostat indicator gov_10a_exp) was 
low in EE (34 percent), medium in BG and UK (38 percent and 41 percent) and high in the rest (47–50 
percent) in 2007. The redistributive impact as measured by the difference in the Gini coefficient of dis-
posable income without and with social transfers excluding public pensions (Eurostat indicators ilc_
di12c and ilc_di12) was the lowest in the EU for IT and EL (1.7-1.8 pp), low in BG and EE (2.6-2.7 pp) 
and high in UK, BE and HU (7.6-8.8 pp) in 2007.
7Total GDP growth in 2001–11 (Eurostat indicator nama_10_gdp) was low in IT and EL (2–4 
percent), modest in UK, BE and HU (16–20 percent) and high in EE and BG (40 percent and 53 per-
cent). In 2007–11, the GDP declined significantly in EL and EE (−18 percent and −11 percent) and 
somewhat in IT, HU and UK (between 1 and 5 percent), while BE and BG experienced a small growth 
(3 percent and 5 percent). Ranked by Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (Eurostat indicator prc_
hicp_aind), BE, IT and the UK show medium increases in price levels (24–27 percent) and other four 
countries high price increases (39–72 percent) in 2001–11.
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results may be sensitive to whether the distribution of market incomes and popu-
lation characteristics are those from the start or the end of the period, rather than 
the middle. We will test the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the household 
survey wave with SILC 2012 (referring to 2011 market incomes), after backrating 
incomes to 2007 levels, and show that our main findings remain valid (see Section 
6.2).
Some policy instruments are not possible to simulate because of data limita-
tions. These include most contributory benefits and pensions (due to the lack of 
information on previous employment and contribution history) and disability ben-
efits (because of the need to know the nature and severity of the disability, which 
is also not present in the data). In the case of non-simulated benefits, we update 
(backdate) entitlements observed for 2007 with a factor reflecting the growth in the 
average entitlement and use these as proxies for 2011 (2001) policies. In this case, it 
is not possible to separate structural effects (unless the instrument was introduced 
or abolished altogether in this period) and all changes in non-simulated benefits 
are shown as indexation effects. For public pensions we believe this does not intro-
duce a significant bias as almost all changes to current pensions in payment are due 
to indexation, while structural changes to pensions (e.g. to pension age or entitle-
ment formulae) typically affect new entrants only. Structural changes may be more 
relevant for non-simulated instruments other than public pensions and to test the 
robustness of our assumption, we carry out an alternative assessment where all 
changes to non-simulated taxes and (non-pension) benefits are treated as part of 
the structural change and show that our findings are again qualitatively very simi-
lar to our baseline approach (see Section 6.2).
In the analysis, we use EUROMOD baseline adjustments for tax evasion 
and for the non take-up of benefits in cases where there is evidence that these are 
sizeable phenomena. The adjustments are the same or equivalent in each of the 
policy scenarios, so we abstract from any change in the extent of evasion or non 
take-up due to changes in policy systems or other factors. We expect that estimates 
that assumed full compliance would be amplified to some extent, compared with 
those shown in the paper, and also that there would be a degree of re-ranking in 
the baseline income distribution, especially in the case of benefit non take-up. By 
definition, those not taking up entitlements to income-tested benefits are located 
towards the bottom of the income distribution.
6. results
We simulate what the distributions of net incomes would have looked like in 
2007 if instead of the actual 2007 tax-benefit systems, alternative systems based 
on those from 2001 and 2011 had been in place, indexing monetary parameters 
with prices (CPI) and income growth (MII). In this way we isolate the direct 
effects of policy developments in the seven countries on which we focus. Our 
results concentrate on the role of tax-benefit policies and abstract from all the 
other drivers of changes in the income distribution over the period. Importantly, 
the policy effect also captures the distributional impact of keeping tax-benefit 
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amounts nominally fixed over time, relative to the movement in prices (CPI) or 
market incomes (MII).
In the following subsections, we present and discuss our findings, starting from 
whether changes to the tax-benefit policies contributed to reducing or increasing 
poverty and inequality and examine similarities and differences in policy effects 
before and after the start of the crisis. We then come to our key point of interest—
the impact of structural changes versus uprating of monetary parameters (i.e. the 
indexation effect) on the income distribution. Based on the latter, we also establish 
how much fiscal drag and benefit erosion there was, as well its incidence across the 
income distribution. Last, we discuss how the results are influenced by the choice 
of benchmark indexation factor.
6.1. The Effects of Policies on Income Poverty and Inequality in the 2000s
To study the distributional impact of policies over time, we consider effects 
on income poverty and inequality and mean household disposable income. We 
use the standard poverty concept, which measures the percentage of the popula-
tion with household income below 60 percent of the median equivalized house-
hold disposable income in the corresponding scenario, and the Gini coefficient 
for income inequality. Disposable income is defined as the sum of gross market 
income and cash benefits, net of direct taxes and social insurance contributions. 
Throughout it is adjusted for differences in household size and composition using 
the modified OECD equivalence scale.
The main results are provided in Table 3 (poverty), Table 4 (inequality) and 
Table 5 (mean incomes), showing the impact of policy changes as estimated with 
the MII- and CPI-based benchmark index. Column 3 in each table shows the base-
line indicator in 2007, while columns 2 and 4 show the indicator value if  the 2001 
and 2011 tax-benefit policies (indexed) had instead been in place in 2007. Further 
columns summarize the policy effect in each sub-period (2001–07 and 2007–11) and 
overall (2001–11). In each period, the total policy effect (TPE) is also decomposed 
into the indexation effect (IE) and structural changes (SC), which will be discussed 
in Section 6.2. All key estimates include asymptotic standard errors (or confidence 
intervals) with a confidence level of 95 percent to account for sampling variation. 
The calculations reflect survey weights and clustering at the household level.
Poverty estimates obtained with the income- and price-indexed benchmarks 
(Table 3, last column) show that policy developments overall in 2001–11 were 
poverty-reducing or poverty-neutral in all countries except Hungary where pov-
erty was higher under alternative policies. This also largely holds when distin-
guishing between the period of  economic growth (2001–07) and economic crisis 
(2007–11)—policies had a substantial poverty-increasing effect only in Hungary 
in both periods and a small but still statistically significant effect in Belgium 
(MII) and Italy (CPI) in one of  the subperiods (graphically presented in Figure 1, 
top panel).
Given that this widely used poverty concept relies on a poverty line defined 
with respect to median income, policy measures can impact measured poverty 
levels not only through direct effects on household incomes but also by affecting 
the poverty line. To gauge the importance of the latter channel, Table A1 in the 
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Appendix provides estimates of policy effects on poverty when holding the poverty 
line constant (at the 2007 level). The differences compared to Table 3 (last column) 
are drastic for Greece, revealing that the overall poverty-reducing effect of policies 
was due to the impact of policies on median incomes rather than the lower part 
of the income distribution per se. To a lesser extent, the same is also true for Italy, 
while the opposite is (partly) shown for Hungary. We can therefore conclude that 
the shifting poverty line is not the dominant factor in most cases.
Figure 1. The Effect of 2001–07 and 2007–11 Policy Changes.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD.  
Notes: poverty line is 60% of national median equivalised disposable income. Asymptotic 
standard errors at a 95% confidence level. The charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval 
between gridlines on each of them is the same (2 percentage points)
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The effect on inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient (see Table 4, 
last column). Policy developments between 2001 and 2011 have clearly increased 
inequality in Hungary when their effect is assessed relative to price- and income-in-
dexed benchmarks, and also in Bulgaria with the MII indexation. The effects across 
countries are qualitatively similar to results for the poverty rate, which due to a 
relative (and shifting) poverty line can also be thought of as a particular inequality 
measure that is sensitive only to changes in the lower half  of the income distribu-
tion. A decomposition by subperiods (see also Figure 1, middle panel) reveals small 
inequality increases also in Italy (MII and CPI) and Belgium (MII). However, what 
is notable is that, measured against the CPI benchmark, policy measures in the first 
period (2001–07) were universally inequality-reducing in all countries.
This may reflect more opportunities for governments to act when the eco-
nomic conditions were more favorable (2001–07), despite both prices and market 
incomes generally growing faster, and as such could point to the need to achieve 
more in periods of economic growth in general to overcome the negative effect 
of crisis periods. To explore this further, we assess how policies affected average 
household disposable income. There is a large heterogeneity across countries in 
both periods and with either benchmark index, as relative changes in disposable 
incomes reveal both substantial gains and losses (Table 5 and Figure 1, bottom 
panel). However, no clear relationship emerges between fiscal and distributional 
policy effects for the period as a whole—recall that apart from Hungary, policies 
were essentially poverty and inequality-reducing, no matter their effect on public 
finances. The case of Hungary demonstrates clearly that policies raising household 
incomes do not necessarily bring a reduction in inequality and poverty and that the 
design of policies matters.
The findings suggest that tax-benefit policies in the 2000s had mostly pov-
erty and inequality-reducing effect in these countries. For further discussion of 
the key policy changes that took place in each country, see Hills et al. (2019). Our 
results for the overall impact on poverty and inequality of policy changes are also 
consistent with the existing evidence for some of these countries and/or the crisis 
period: e.g. for the UK: Adam and Browne, 2010; Bargain et al. , 2017, for Belgium: 
Decoster et al., 2015, for EU countries during the crisis: De Agostini et al. , 2016; 
Paulus and Tasseva, 2018.
6.2. Indexation Effects Versus Structural Changes
We further separate the policy effect into the indexation effect, which mea-
sures the contribution of changes in benefit amounts and tax thresholds over 
time, and structural changes where systems were redesigned in other ways, such 
as changes in percentage rates of tax. As such, the indexation effect captures 
actual fiscal drag and benefit erosion and, to our knowledge, our analysis rep-
resents the first attempt to measure it size and distribution for the tax-benefit 
systems as a whole. The results for this additional decomposition can be found in 
Table 3 (poverty), Table 4 (inequality) and Table 5 (mean incomes).
Comparing the structural changes and the indexation effect of 2001–11 poli-
cies on poverty (graphically shown in Figure 2, top panel), we find that the index-
ation effect and structural changes were both sizeable and their relative importance 
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varies across countries. However, while structural changes have had a mixed impact 
on poverty, the indexation effect has been poverty-reducing or essentially pover-
ty-neutral. This conclusion is robust to the choice of benchmark indexation factor 
and also similar for inequality outcomes (Figure 2, middle panel). Furthermore, 
the results suggest that adjustments by governments to monetary values of policy 
parameters over this period were often instrumental in driving the overall policy 
effect on poverty and inequality.
The more favorable impact of the indexation effect compared to the struc-
tural changes is even more emphasized for average household disposable income 
Figure 2. The Structural Change and Indexation Effect of 2001–11 Policy Changes.  
Source: Own calculations using EUROMOD.  
Notes: poverty line is 60% of national median equivalised disposable income. Asymptotic 
standard errors at a 95% confidence level. The charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval 
between gridlines on each of them is the same (2 percentage points).
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(Figure 2, bottom panel). Our estimates show that across the countries, apart from 
Italy, benefit amounts and tax thresholds were increased by more than growth in 
prices and also stayed ahead of growth in market incomes. This implies that on 
the whole, in the period 2001–11 the evolution of public policies in these coun-
tries did not result in increased tax revenues due to fiscal drag or decreased social 
expenditure due to benefit erosion. This is highly informative and demonstrates the 
added value of this assessment compared with studies on fiscal drag and benefit 
erosion, which focus on hypothetical economic scenarios without policy action. 
In interpreting the generally rather positive influence of indexation effects on the 
income distribution, it is important to remember that they include the effects of 
both regular statutory indexation and discretionary increases (or decreases) to ben-
efit levels and tax thresholds. Exploring policy effects also by type of policy instru-
ments (Figures A3 to A6 in the Appendix), reveals that the indexation effects were 
primarily due to public pensions or other benefits, while the structural changes 
stemmed from developments to taxes and social insurance contributions.
Considering changes to disposable income across the distribution, Figure 3 
shows the effect of the two types of policy on disposable income by income decile 
groups. Except in Hungary and Bulgaria (in the MII scenario), income gains due 
to policies are proportionally larger (or losses smaller) for lower income groups, 
meaning the overall policy effect is pro-poor. It is notable how different the distri-
butional profiles of the indexation effect and structural changes are, even opposite 
in some cases. The progressive impact tends to be driven by the indexation effect, 
which makes a positive contribution to household incomes across the income dis-
tribution in all countries but Italy and Bulgaria (with the MII-based benchmark 
index). Structural changes are more heterogenous showing a mix of positive and 
negative impacts on household incomes across deciles and countries, though they 
appear more often regressive with only Italy and the UK showing a progressive 
impact.
Distinguishing further between the two subperiods, it is notable that the struc-
tural changes in the crisis period (2007–11) had no statistically significant pov-
erty- or inequality-reducing effect (Table 3 and Table 4). On the other hand, the 
indexation effect in the crisis period contributed to lower poverty and inequal-
ity in all countries except in Italy (where the effect was positive though small). In 
the period of economic growth (2001–07), the two effects were more varied across 
countries.
We have also carried out two alternative assessments to check the sensitiv-
ity and robustness of our key results. In the first one, we tested the sensitivity of 
our main results to changes in the distribution of market incomes and popula-
tion characteristics to the extent possible with available data. Specifically, we esti-
mated the effect of policy changes on income poverty, inequality and mean income 
using more recent micro-data on market incomes and population characteristics 
(SILC 2012 and for the UK FRS 2012/13), after backrating incomes to 2007 levels. 
Although the magnitude of the policy effect changes in some cases (detailed results 
are provided in section B in the Appendix), our general insights remain valid.
Secondly, we carried out a robustness check where all changes in non-simu-
lated taxes and (non-pension) benefits are treated as part of  the structural change, 
rather than the indexation effect as in our baseline approach. The alternative 
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estimates of  the effect of  policy changes on income poverty, the Gini coefficient 
and mean income (detailed results are provided in section C in the Appendix) 
confirm that our main finding are qualitatively very similar to our baseline 
approach and our conclusions are also robust to the treatment of  non-simulated 
instruments.
Figure 3. The Effect of 2001–11 Policies on Disposable Income by Income Decile Groups.  
Source: own calculations using EUROMOD.  
Notes: The charts are drawn to different scales, but the interval between gridlines on each of them 
is the same (10 percentage points).
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6.3. The Role of the Benchmark Indexation Factor
Finally, we discuss how empirical results for a given country are influenced 
by the choice of benchmark index α. First of all, the results for the effect of pol-
icies on average disposable income (Table 5) confirm that the estimated income 
gains are higher (or losses smaller), the lower the benchmark indexation factor 
(Table 1). There is also a general pattern of the policy effect being less pro-poor 
the higher the value of the benchmark indexation factor (Table 3 and Table 4). 
Unsurprisingly, there is greater variation in the results for a given country by 
indexation factor where the indexation factors themselves differ from each other 
more, i.e. countries with a large income growth or inflation like Bulgaria and 
Estonia.
Our finding that the effect of taxes and benefits is less pro-poor the higher 
the benchmark indexation factor in a given country is also demonstrated with 
the ranking of lines in Figure 3 being inversely related to the size of benchmark 
index. This in turn implies that failing to index in practice relative to the chosen 
benchmark also has a pro-rich effect. This is further illustrated in Figure A1 in the 
Appendix, which shows the policy effect on the Kakwani index (Kakwani, 1977) 
by the main tax-benefit components (benefits, pensions, taxes and social insurance 
contributions). It reveals that the pro-poor pattern of policy effects tends to be 
reduced or even becomes pro-rich the higher the benchmark indexation factor.
Indexing counterfactual monetary parameters such as benefit amounts and 
tax bracket thresholds (or allowances) adjusts counterfactual benefit entitlements 
and tax liabilities in proportion to the benchmark indexation factor.8 How this in 
turn affects estimated income gains (or losses) from policy changes and their inci-
dence, depends on the nature of the scheme. For a progressive scheme such as a 
means-tested benefit or a progressive tax, a lower value of the benchmark index-
ation factor provides a larger relative gain from policies for those with lower 
incomes.9 For a regressive scheme such as a proportional tax with an upper limit on 
the tax base, it results in smaller relative losses for those with higher incomes.
Overall, tax-benefit systems are highly progressive in all seven countries (see 
Figure A2 in the Appendix) and it is for this reason that for a given country a larger 
benchmark indexation factor reduces policy-related income gains (cf. equation 1 
and 2 in Section 3). Intuitively, for a progressive system, any government action is 
assessed to be less generous the higher the chosen benchmark index. Furthermore, 
as counterfactual disposable income reacts more in relative terms to an increase 
in the benchmark index (i.e. elasticity with respect to α is higher) at lower income 
levels, the impact of policies on income is reduced faster for low income house-
holds and overall becomes less pro-poor. Our finding is consistent with previous 
work, which has demonstrated the pro-rich effects of price indexation when this 
has lagged behind income growth (e.g. Clark and Leicester, 2004; Sutherland et al. , 
2008) and our discussion above provides an explanation for that pattern.
8As long as a given tax or benefit instrument is linearly homogenous.
9This is easiest to see for a lump-sum benefit. Using a higher benchmark index to derive the coun-
terfactual value reduces policy-related income gains by the same absolute amount for everyone, but the 
loss is greater for low income households relative to their total income.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2019
21
© 2019 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf 
of International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
These insights highlight the importance of the choice of the benchmark index-
ation factor as it affects not only the measurement of size but also the progressivity 
of tax-benefit policy reforms. Varying the factor should not only be used as a 
robustness check as has mostly been done in the previous literature, it has implica-
tions both for how governments uprate policy parameters in practice to achieve 
their fiscal and distributional goals but also for how one intends to measure them.10
7. conclusions
In this paper, we assess the effects of tax and benefit policies in 2001–11 
on the distribution of household disposable income in selected EU countries. 
There are many factors, which can influence the labor market and the income 
distribution (e.g. demographic changes), but the focus here is on the direct impact 
of fiscal policy changes over this decade. To quantify the effects of tax-benefit 
policy developments, we construct counterfactual income distributions using the 
microsimulation method. We further decompose the policy effect distinguish-
ing between structural policy changes and how policy parameters such as ben-
efit amounts and tax bracket thresholds have evolved over time (the indexation 
effect). We also split the period of analysis into two, using 2007 as the mid-point 
to investigate policy effects before and since the Great Recession.
Our main results of the empirical analysis are as follows. The combined effect 
of changes in taxes (direct taxes and social insurance contributions) and transfers 
(social security benefits and public pensions) in the 2000s managed to alleviate 
poverty and inequality in most countries. While the result is robust to the two 
benchmark indexation factors we use, the latter nevertheless affect the estimates of 
the size and incidence of income gains or losses. For a given country, the higher the 
benchmark indexation factor (i.e. the more is demanded from a government), the 
smaller and less pro-poor are the measured income gains.
We also find that benefit amounts and tax thresholds were in practice mostly 
increased by more than growth in prices and, during the crisis, also stayed ahead 
of growth in average market incomes (as it lagged behind price increases). Hence, 
the component capturing the indexation effect typically achieved more in terms 
of reducing poverty and inequality than changes to the structure of policies, 
which were nevertheless often large in absolute terms. In particular, the structural 
changes that governments introduced in the 2007–11 crisis period notably failed to 
contribute to the reduction of poverty- and inequality. This means that countries 
redesigned their systems rather than resorted to less explicit fiscal drag and ben-
efit erosion when their public finances came under pressure. This has important 
implications for understanding government choices but also for future research on 
household responses to changes in marginal effective tax rates (for an earlier anal-
ysis exploiting fiscal drag to analyze household responses, see Saez, 2003).
10These results use a ranking of households based on their 2007 disposable income in each sce-
nario. We also tested sensitivity of results to alternative rankings using household incomes from the 
2001 and 2011 policy scenarios (and indexation assumption-specific values). The comparisons suggest 
that while the different rankings do indeed alter the pictures to some extent, especially at the bottom of 
the distributions, the story that they tell is broadly the same.
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Our analysis covers seven EU countries that are diverse in terms of the size 
and type of welfare state and their recent economic experiences. Nevertheless, and 
with some exceptions noted above, our general findings are robust across coun-
tries. This demonstrates the value of multi-country analysis within a consistent 
and comparable framework. Empirical results that for one country might be inter-
preted as applicable only in that case, are likely to have wider implications if  they 
remain valid in many cases.
The main policy lesson from our findings is the need to understand the 
important influence of the way governments uprate (index) policies on poverty and 
inequality. Certainly, policy efforts aimed at reducing inequalities should not solely 
focus on structural changes and the two types of policy instruments should be seen 
as complements. However, it remains an open question, whether the governments 
in the countries studied here systematically overestimated the need for uprating the 
monetary parameters of their tax-benefit policies or consciously sought to reduce 
inequalities through the use of indexation.
Despite our encouraging empirical results for a specific period, a comprehen-
sive system of statutory indexation could help to ensure further that the tax-benefit 
system is not lagging behind economic developments and also to limit the scope 
for political credit being claimed when policy changes are merely keeping pace. 
Furthermore, no matter how extensive the statutory indexation system is, it is 
equally important that governments are open about their long-term indexation tar-
gets which could then provide a clear basis to measure progress or lack of it against 
those targets. From a research perspective, on the other hand, the need to develop a 
definition of the optimal level of indexation taking account of relevant outcomes 
such as income distribution, work incentives, fiscal balance and economic growth 
offers avenues for future work.
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